

Passive Learning and Incentivized Communication: A Randomized Controlled Trial in India*

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November 1, 2017

Abstract

New technologies are important to improve the well-being of poor communities, but many barriers prevent adoption from reaching its socially optimal level. In order to better understand the extent of informational barriers for adoption of a simple household product, we designed a randomized controlled trial on willingness to pay (WTP) for solar lanterns in India. We gave high quality solar lanterns to randomly selected ‘seed’ households in a non-electrified region of the state of Uttar Pradesh. Each seed household provides the names of three friends whom we randomly assign to one of the three following groups: control, passive learning and incentivized communication. We elicit WTP from the control group exactly when the seed receives the lantern. We elicit WTP from the friends in the passive learning and incentivized communication groups thirty days after the seed receives the solar lantern. In addition, the seed is given a small reward for arranging a tea meeting with only the friend assigned to the incentivized communication group. During the meeting, the seed showcases the usage of the solar lantern and shares his or her user experience. We show that both passive learning and incentivized communication have large positive effects on WTP. Passive learning increases WTP by 90% and incentivized communication by 145% relative to the control group. Our results have important implications for understanding the magnitudes of learning and improved information flow among peers on WTP for new technologies.

JEL: D83, O33, Q21, Q42

*We thank Johannes Urpelainen for helpful inputs in all stages of the project, participants at the Economic Development in Africa annual conference at the University of Oxford, (CSAE) Center for the Studies of African Economies (Oxford); the Nordic Development Economics Conference (Oslo); and the Association of Swedish Development Economists workshop (Gothenburg) for helpful comments on earlier versions of the paper. We are also grateful to MORSEL India for administering the field work and data collection. The randomized controlled trial was financed by the Swedish Research Council Formas through the program Human Cooperation to Manage Natural Resources (COMMONS) at the Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg. All errors remain our own.

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1 Introduction

Economic growth theories portray technological progress as the engine of economic development and prosperity. The recent version of this theory uses endogenous growth models to highlight the important role of social learning in technology diffusion (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988; Aghion and Howitt, 1997; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004; Acemoglu, 2009). Economic growth in this set-up is characterized to be driven endogenously within the economy through investment in human capital, knowledge and innovation. Profit maximizing firms invest, learn by doing and learn from each other through knowledge spillovers and these processes induce smooth technological diffusion in the economy. The theory was later applied to understand the feature of technological innovation and diffusion in agriculture in developing countries (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Bardhan and Udry, 1999; Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Conley and Udry, 2010). Using state-of-the-art empirical strategies, this strand of literature identifies the role of social networks in promoting social learning, adoption and diffusion of new agricultural technologies.

One feature of earlier studies on the role of social networks is the assumption of “passive learning”, a situation in which peers learn about new technologies from their peers without cost. However, in a recent research, Ben-Yishay and Mobarak (2014) show that the power of social networks in diffusion of new technologies could be enhanced by incentivizing information communication. In this paper, we attempt to shed light on the role and magnitude of incentivizing information communication by one’s network members or peers on willingness to pay (WTP) for new technology using a randomized controlled trial (RCT) in India. Motivated by theories of intra-household decision-making, we also investigate the role of gender in information communication and willingness to pay for the new technology.

We collaborated with a local organization and distributed a new solar-powered lantern to households in Gonda district, Uttar Pradesh state of India. The solar lanterns are durable, multipurpose, and convenient to use worth 1,200 rupees (USD 18.5) in Lucknow, the capital of Uttar Pradesh state at the time of the fieldwork (Fall, 2015). Notably, the lanterns have a mobile-charging feature which allows the user to charge a mobile phone. The study area is still non-electrified and households did not have knowledge about the solar lanterns prior to the study. We randomly selected 200 seed individuals, half of them male and half of them female, to whom we offered the solar lantern for participating in the study. Each seed household gave three names of peers (friends or relatives), and these were randomly assigned into a “network treatment”, a “communication treatment” and a “control group”. We elicited willingness to pay for the solar lanterns from the control group immediately after interviewing the seed household using the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak

(BDM) method (Becker, Degroot, and Marschak, 1964). In the network group, the subjects, who were designated as friends by the seed, were interviewed 30 days after the seed received the solar lantern to elicit their willingness to pay. We refer to the learning captured through this process as “passive learning”. In the communication group, the 30-day delay was followed by a tea meeting at which the seed presented the solar lantern and shared his or her experience with the friend in return for a payment of 100 rupees (USD 1.54).¹ We refer to the learning captured through this process as “incentivized communication”.

The results show that peers who most probably learned about the solar lantern through their relationship with the seed household are on average willing to pay 120 rupees more than the control group a month after the lanterns have been distributed. Peers who were invited to a demonstration tea meeting by the seed households a month after the lanterns have been distributed, on the other hand, are willing to pay 190 rupees more than the control group. With a mean WTP of 134 in the control group, the proportional treatment effects are 90% and 145%, respectively. Both treatment effects appear to be large. It is notable that the passive learning treatment effect almost doubled WTP, whereas incentivized communication added another 55 percentage points increase in the treatment effect.

This paper is broadly related to a body of research in economics on the impact of peers on one’s outcomes. This strand of literature, focusing mostly in developed countries, investigates the impact of peers or friends on several outcome variables of interest including educational achievement (e.g., Hoxby, 2000; Sacerdote, 2001; Angrist and Lang, 2002; Zimmerman, 2003; Figlio, 2005), market and health outcomes (e.g., Munshi, 2003; Kling and Liebman, 2007), labor productivity and consumption (e.g., Mobius, Niehaus, and Rosenblat, 2005; Mas and Moretti, 2009) and adoption of technology (Oster and Thornton, 2012). The extent of peer effects has also been examined in the development economics literature largely to explain agricultural technology adoption (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Bardhan and Udry, 1999; Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Conley and Udry, 2010). A particularly important observation in this literature is that modern agricultural technologies promote yield significantly, but their adoption or uptake rate has been disappointingly low. These studies show that when farmers consider adopting new technologies, they are likely to trust recommendations from their peers, friends, or members of their social network who have experienced the technology rather than from others external to their community.

In a recent study, BenYishay and Mobarak (2014) investigate social learning further by designing a randomized controlled trial in rural Malawi to vary the method of dissemination of information about two agricultural technologies that promote yield - pit planting and Chinese composting. These authors specifi-

¹At the time of the survey, 1 USD = 65 rupees.

cally investigate whether provision of performance-based rewards to information communicators about the new technologies results in increased diffusion of the technologies. Among the three types of information communicators they chose - government employed extension workers, lead farmers, and peer farmers - adoption of the technologies by others was much very likely in response to the information provided by peer farmers. Our paper adds to this literature by disentangling the magnitudes of “passive learning”, i.e., learning from others without cost and “incentivized communication”, learning from others through improved quality of information, on willingness to adopt and pay for the new technology. Unlike agricultural technologies which involve uncertainty and take time to capture their payoff, the solar lantern we consider is easy to use, multi-purpose and easy to assess its payoffs with greater certainty in a short time. Our design also allows us to aggregate revealed WTP, a figure important for policymakers and other stakeholders to design optimal subsidy and cost reduction strategies to encourage diffusion of the technology in case when average WTP is lower than average cost.

The major challenge in identifying the impact of peers on adoption of new technologies by fellow peers even after tackling endogeneity through a randomized assignment, is understanding the mechanisms that drive the observed results. It may be that peers imitate each other rather than learn from each other about the benefits of the new technology or learn how to operate of the technology (Oster and Thornton, 2012). In order to shed light on the possible mechanisms, we collected detailed information on familiarity with solar lanterns, perception about their benefit, estimated market value, etc.. As expected, we find that both the network and the communication groups are likely to have seen a solar lantern before the date of the WTP experiment, and they are much more likely to know someone owning a lantern compared to the control group. We also find that compared to thte control group, subjects in both treatment groups believe that the solar lantern needs proper maintenance in order to function properly and they estimate its market price to be higher. We also observe that subjects initially don't seem to differentiate solar lanterns from kerosene lamps, which are the most common sources of lighting in the study area. However as they see their friend taking care of the solar panel through which the lantern is powered, the power of the light coming out the lantern, and the mobile phone charging function, they estimate the market price of the lantern to be higher. Consequently they are willing to pay more for the lantern. These results suggest that learning both how to operate the technology and the benefits provided by the technology drive the high WTP the treatment groups reveal, most probably to a larger extent that of the communications group's.

The paper also speaks to the emerging literature on electrification in developing countries (Dinkelman, 2011; Dugoua and Urpelainen, 2014; Furukawa, 2014; Grimm et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2016; Lee, Miguel, and

Wolfram, 2016), an area of research that overlaps with development and energy economics. The current level of electrification in developing regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America remains low (International Energy Agency, 2014). Extending the grid to the most rural regions requires high levels of investment that are often difficult to be secured by governments. Solar power serves as a decentralized solution to the problem of energy poverty, and is slowly diffusing throughout rural Africa and rural South Asia (Sandwell, Wheeler, and Nelson, 2017). However, tight household budget constraints, poor product quality and little local expertise in photovoltaic technologies have been hindering faster adoption.² In addition, given the increased need to reduce greenhouse gas emission from the energy sector, exploring the role of solar-powered lighting equipment, which literally emits no greenhouse gas would have large benefits to the society at large. From public policy point of view, the findings from this paper would therefore be significant in providing useful information on willingness to uptake such technologies and the factors that drive their quick diffusion.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses relationship of the current paper to existing literature. Section 3 lays out our key hypotheses about willingness to pay for solar lanterns. Section 4 describes the design and procedure of the randomized controlled trial, with results of the randomization checks. Section 5 presents the key empirical results. Section 6 concludes.

2 Relationship to Existing Literature

This paper contributes to a large and growing literature on the role of peers - co-workers, friends, acquaintances on one's behavior and outcome that builds off the work of Sacerdote (2001), Hoxby (2000), Munshi (2003), and Mobius, Niehaus, and Rosenblat (2005). Friends and members of social networks influence one's beliefs and consequently decisions. These studies, almost exclusively focused in developed countries, document the impact of peers on one's educational achievements, labor productivity, and consumption behavior respectively. Roommates affect one's freshman GPA, the decision to join social organizations, and classmates influence reading scores in elementary schools in the United States (Sacerdote, 2001; Hoxby, 2000). Peers and networks members help Mexican migrants in the United States find a higher-paying job (Munshi, 2003) and have as large of an effect as advertising on consumer demand (Mobius, Niehaus, and Rosenblat, 2005). Other studies in similar settings (e.g., Zimmerman, 2003; Angrist and Lang, 2002; Figlio, 2005; Kling and Liebman, 2007; Mas and Moretti, 2009) further document the role of peers in influencing one's behavior and decisions.

²See Karakaya and Sriwannawit (2015) for a recent systematic review the literature on barriers to the adoption of photovoltaic technologies.

There are studies (e.g., [Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995](#); [Bandiera and Rasul, 2006](#); [Conley and Udry, 2010](#)) investigating the role of peers in social networks in adoption and diffusion of productivity-enhancing modern agricultural technologies in developing countries. These studies were mainly motivated by the fact that modern agricultural technologies promote yield significantly and improve welfare, but their adoption and diffusion rates have been sub-optimally slow. Adoption of a new agricultural technology by a farmer is a social process because it generates knowledge to all her peers and increases their expected yield ([Bardhan and Udry, 1999](#)). This strand of literature implies that farmers in developing countries are likely to trust recommendations by fellow farmers than by those from other people external to their community. In view of this, social networks play a significant role in diffusion of new technologies. Outside an agricultural set-up, more recently [Oster and Thornton \(2012\)](#) investigate the role of peer effects in adoption of menstrual cups by school girls in Nepal and documents a strong effect on learning how to use the technology.

There are methodological challenges in identifying the impact of social networks on technology adoption using observational data. First, when two friends are both adopting a certain technology, it is difficult to distinguish whether it is because the two friends learn from each other or individuals who are open to try out a new technology also have friends with similar characteristics that are unobservable ([Manski, 1993](#)). Second, it is difficult to precisely define the social network of adopter of a new technology and even so, it may be that individuals are just imitating each other rather than learning from each other ([Conley and Udry, 2010](#)). Recent studies used the method of randomization to tackle these identification problems ([Sacerdote, 2001](#); [Kremer and Levy, 2008](#); [Rao, Mobius, and Rosenblat, 2007](#); [Duflo and Saez, 2003](#); [Godlonton and Thornton, 2012](#); [Miguel and Kremer, 2004](#); [Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson, 2011](#); [Kremer and Miguel, 2007](#); [Oster and Thornton, 2012](#)).

A key feature of previous studies on the role of peers on adoption of new technologies ([Bandiera and Rasul, 2006](#); [Conley and Udry, 2010](#); [Oster and Thornton, 2012](#)) is the implicit assumption of learning from peers without a cost, i.e., “passive learning” ([BenYishay and Mobarak, 2014](#)). New technologies could be adopted and diffused faster if peers that communicate information about the new technology are rewarded. This is the key argument by [BenYishay and Mobarak \(2014\)](#) who design a randomized controlled trial to vary the method of dissemination for two agricultural technologies - pit planting and Chinese composting - which are believed to improve maize yield in rural Malawi. These authors confirm the importance of social networks in diffusion of agricultural technologies, but argue that their power can be significantly improved by remunerating the peer who adopts the technology and makes a conscious effort to communicate and convince other fellow farmers.

Our paper contributes to this literature in three main ways. First, this paper is the first to examine the impact of rewarding communication about a new technology on willingness to pay - as opposed to a binary measure of adoption. We clearly identify the impact and magnitude of both passive networks and incentivized communication by peers about a new solar lantern technology on WTP using a randomized controlled trial. This distinction is important because estimating average willingness to pay allows policymakers to estimate whether new technologies could be distributed profitably and the amount of resources required to speed up adoption and diffusion in case revealed WTP is lower than the cost of the new technology. Second, unlike agricultural technologies, which take time to observe their benefit and involve substantial uncertainty, solar lanterns are easy technologies to learn about in a short period of time. As a result, biophysical and climatic factors, which seem to differ markedly even between closely located farms would not be confounded with the decision to adopt and WTP for the technology. Third, we consider a technology which is not only quick to learn about, but also has a significant welfare effect on all members of households. The current rate of electrification in developing regions of the world is very low and households very often use kerosene lamps for lighting. Using kerosene lamps has been documented to generate indoor air pollution and affect health outcomes of members adversely, exert risk of burns and fires, emit hazardous greenhouse gases, and requires rural households to regularly travel long distance to buy kerosene (Lam et al., 2012). The solar lanterns we randomly distributed among other things, are multi-purpose, affordable, and reasonably-priced with a significant potential to enhance health outcomes of all household members, reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help children allocate more time to studying.

3 Conceptual Framework

We now lay out a brief motivating framework for interpreting the main results, drawing on Foster and Rosenzweig (1995); Bardhan and Udry (1999); Bandiera and Rasul (2006); Conley and Udry (2010); BenYishay and Mobarak (2014). In order to do so, we define the following treatments:

- In the *network treatment* group, subjects observe the use of a new technology by others without incentivized communication. Thus, learning from others is passive.
- In the *communication treatment* group, subjects both observe the use of new technology by others and receive direct communication about the properties of the new technology just before WTP is elicited. Thus, learning from others is considered to be ‘active’.

To test the presence of social learning – that is, learning from others – in agriculture, these studies make

use of the “target-input” model proposed by [Wilson \(1975\)](#) and [Jovanovic and Nyarko \(1994\)](#). According to this model, the farmer knows the basic form of the new technology (e.g., an improved seed) with certainty, but does not know the target level, which is assumed to be random. Farm profit is inversely related to the difference between the actual level of input applied and the target level. The farmer realizes what the actual level of input should have been only after the input has been applied and output has been realized. As a result, the farmer learns about the new technology over time through learning-by-doing.

In the target-input model, individuals can also learn from each other’s experience when they share similar distribution of the input target. Assume two farmers who belong to a certain social network and share information with each other or costlessly observe each other’s input choice. In each period, farmers use Bayes’ rule to update their prior belief on the variance of the optimal input level making use of information from their own experience and the experience of their network members. Thus, adoption of a new technology in this model is a social process because it’s adoption by an individual generates information spill-over to all her peers which increases their expected welfare in the future ([Bardhan and Udry, 1999](#)). Diffusion of solar lanterns can be modelled using the social learning framework because peers of seed households observe (without any cost) the service provided by the lanterns and immediately update their belief about the quality of the lanterns. Consequently, these individuals would be willing to pay more than those who did not have prior information about the lanterns.

Hypothesis 1. *The network treatment increases willingness to pay.*

An important extension of the ‘target-input’ model by [BenYishay and Mobarak \(2014\)](#) is that the member of the social network that communicates information about the new technology, i.e., the “communicator” knows the optimal level of the technology. However, it would be costly to transfer her knowledge about the new technology to other fellow farmers. If there is an intervention that rewards the information communicator based on what proportion of farmers adopted the new technology as a result of the communicator’s efforts, diffusion of the technology occurs much faster. Such type of incentives induce the communicator to make a conscious effort and bear the cost of communication and transmit information about the new technology to others ([BenYishay and Mobarak, 2014](#)). As a result, others will learn about the new technology and adopt it much faster than the case of unincentivized communication through ordinary social networks. In our case, rewarding seed households to invite one of their randomly selected peers for a tea meeting after using the solar lanterns for a month will result in transmission of more accurate information. As a result, peers who have been provided detailed information about the attributes of the solar lanterns in such a way are likely to pay more for the lanterns than peers that were not invited for the tea meeting (the network treatment

group).

Hypothesis 2. *The communication treatment increases willingness to pay more than the network treatment.*

Another aim of our RCT is testing the role of gender in communication about a new technology. Early studies (Chiappori, 1992; Browning and Chiappori, 1998; Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix, 2002; Bourguignon, Browning, and Chiappori, 2009) from industrialized countries show that although members of a household (most importantly, couples) often have different preferences and intra-household bargaining power, they still achieve Pareto-efficient outcomes in household decision-making. However, studies in developing countries document rejection of Pareto-efficiency in household decision-making, most importantly because of preference and intra-household bargaining power difference between husbands and wives. Udry (1996) documents that total yield by farm households in Burkina Faso could be improved by relocating inputs from male-cultivated plots to female-cultivated plots.³ Schaner (2015) provides evidence indicating that households in Kenya make sub-optimal saving decisions as a result of differences in discount rates of couples. More recent studies (Miller and Mobarak, 2013; Alem, Hassen, and Köhlin, 2017) show that improved cookstoves, which enhance the quality of life of all household members, are valued significantly higher by women compared to men, but could not be adopted optimally because women have low decision-making power (autonomy).

Drawing on these studies, we test the hypothesis that female social networks are less effective in promoting technology adoption. If female members of a household have less bargaining power than male members, then female social networks, compared to male social networks, are channels of information transmission that focus on a less-influential decision-maker. Because the female member who learns information through her social network lacks the autonomy to make the purchase, we expect the information to be less relevant than in the case of male social networks. Thus, when either passive learning or incentivized communication occurs through female networks, women's lack of decision-making power impedes learning by the relevant decision-maker, and thus the effect of the treatment on WTP in the household should be of lesser magnitude.

Hypothesis 3. *Learning through male social networks increases willingness to pay by more than learning through female social networks.*

³A related study, Robinson (2012), documents that the response in private consumption to an exogenous shock is significantly different between wives and husbands in western Kenya implying that informal risk-sharing mechanisms within households are not Pareto-efficient.

4 Experimental Design

To test our hypotheses, we conducted a WTP experiment in 200 unelectrified habitations of Gonda district in the state of Uttar Pradesh, India.⁴ Habitations (also called sub-villages or hamlets) are the lowest administrative units in India. The subjects were given an opportunity to purchase a solar lantern in a BDM game. We compared the effects of a network treatment and a communication treatment using randomly assigned male and female contacts. The experiment was conducted in two rounds between the end of July and the beginning of October 2015. The study area was chosen because it had a low electricity access rate, with many unelectrified habitations close to Gonda City, the district capital. To avoid data mining and bias from multiple comparisons, a detailed pre-analysis plan (PAP) listing all research hypotheses and our key empirical specification was registered with Evidence in the Governance and Politics.⁵

The primary specification equation can be written as follows:

$$WTP_{ij} = \alpha + \beta_1 N_i + \beta_2 N_i F_i + \gamma_1 N_i C_i + \gamma_2 N_i C_i F_i + \mu_j + \epsilon_{ij}, \quad (1)$$

where WTP_i is the willingness to pay for a solar lantern of household i within habitations j ; N_i is a dummy variable coding for whether household i knows a lantern user through its social network (either through the social network of the head or that of the spouse); F_i is a dummy variable coding for whether the lantern user is known through the social network of the female spouse; C_i is a dummy variable coding for whether the household engaged in active communication with the lantern user of his network; μ_j is a vector of habitation fixed effects ($N = 200$); ϵ_{ij} is a random error term. Our objective is to estimate $\beta_1, \beta_2, \gamma_1, \gamma_2$. Throughout, we cluster standard errors by habitations. In this estimation framework, the hypotheses can be expressed as follows. Hypothesis 1 is equivalent to $\beta_1 > 0$ and $\beta_1 + \beta_2 > 0$; Hypothesis 2 to $\gamma_1 > 0$ and $\gamma_1 + \gamma_2 > 0$; Hypothesis 3 to $\beta_2 < 0$ and $\gamma_2 < 0$.

4.1 Outcome Variable

In the experiment, the subjects were given an opportunity to purchase a solar lantern. Photos of the lantern can be found in the appendix. The retail price of the lantern was 1,200 rupees. The product features included a 3-watt solar panel, a 6V 4.5Ah battery, a 3-watt, 24-piece surface-mounted-device LED, and a mobile charging socket. We chose the product based on a review of solar lanterns available among Uttar Pradesh distributors. We confirmed the performance of the lanterns - in terms of the quality and duration

⁴Before implementation, the experiment was reviewed and approved by the internal review board (IRB) of Columbia University.

⁵The PAP is publicly available at <http://egap.org/registration/1420>.

of the lighting, and the charging power - by using them with the survey team for about a week.

The outcome variable is the subject's WTP measured in the BDM game. As [Becker, Degroot, and Marschak \(1964\)](#) show, the BDM game recovers the subject's true preference by removing incentives to misrepresent WTP for strategic reasons. In the game, the subject is requested to provide his or her highest WTP for an item, and the price of the item is then drawn from a random distribution. If the price is below the stated WTP, the subject pays the *randomly drawn price*, not the stated WTP. Therefore, the subject has no incentive to understate WTP to obtain a better bargain. This method has been widely applied in development economics to measure WTP (e.g., [Hoffmann, 2009](#); [Levine et al., 2012](#); [Guiteras et al., 2013](#)) because it is incentive-compatible and provides a continuous demand curve, as opposed to demand estimates for a discrete number of price points (as is the case in a typical randomized-price WTP measurement).

The game was played in the field as follows. Each household is requested to announce their maximal willingness to pay on a 0-1,200 rupee scale, and the actual price is determined by a random draw from a bag which contains 21 balls, each one of them with a number written on it. The number goes from 0 to 1,200 rupees in increments of 100 rupees. The respondent first makes a bid and then randomly draws a ball. If the price on the ball the respondent draws is higher than the bid, the respondent is not allowed to purchase the lantern. If the price on the ball is lower than the bid, the respondent must purchase the lantern at the price that was drawn. As a result, when the respondent makes a bid, he must make sure he has access to the funds. The respondent has only one chance to play, and he cannot change his bid after drawing a ball. Before the respondent gets to play for 'real', the game is played for a bar of soap to make sure the respondent fully understands the rules.

Figure 1 displays the distribution of the bids: we see that most subjects made a positive bid, but no subject offered the non-subsidized market price of the lantern. We also note that the willingness to pay displays important variation across individuals spanning from 0 to 1200 with mean 239 and standard deviation 266.

[Figure 1 about here.]

In measuring WTP, we paid particular attention to training the enumerators so that they explained the procedure to the subjects carefully enough and always conducted the practice round with soap. Based on our observation of the WTP measurement, the subjects understood the rules of the game. No subject complained afterwards or refused to pay in case they won the solar lantern. The subjects were sometimes disappointed if they did not win the lantern, but in that case they also did not have to give any money.

4.2 Sampling and Treatments

The data collection began with a mapping of 200 primary habitations and 25 replacement habitations around Gonda City. The enumerators approached the habitations in expanding circles, with habitations near Gonda City visited first and those further away visited later. If a habitation was excluded because of safety concerns or because it had access to grid electricity, a randomly drawn replacement habitation was used instead. Overall, we had to exclude and replace five habitations. The map of the study area and habitations is shown in Figure 2.

[Figure 2 about here.]

Within each habitation, the enumerators approach a randomly chosen ‘seed’ household and, depending on the treatment, interview either an adult male or female member. The seed is requested to provide names of three friends, and the three friends are then randomly assigned to three groups: control, network, and communication. The control group is interviewed on the same day and the network and communication treatments approximately 30 days after the initial interview. If the chosen friend is not himself or herself the household head, we interview the head of the household to which that friend belongs to. Households in the three treatment groups are offered the possibility to buy a solar lantern through a BDM game.

The timeline of the experiment is summarized in Figure 3. The experiment began with sampling and the interviews of the control group in July-August 2015. In each habitation, the network and communication groups are interviewed approximately one month after sampling. We survey the network group at the same time as the communication group to avoid treatment spillovers. Table 1 summarizes the size of the different treatment groups. We visited a total of 197 habitations, 98 assigned to the male seed treatment and 99 to female seed treatment. Three habitations were dropped because the network and communications friends were no longer living in the surroundings, and hence could not be surveyed.

[Figure 3 about here.]

[Table 1 about here.]

The male-female treatment is randomized at the habitation level. One of the researchers draws a random number for each habitation and assigned the highest 100 numbers to the female treatment. All seed households are given a free solar lantern in exchange for taking part in the survey. They are also paid 100 rupees conditional on inviting one of the three friends for a tea meeting to introduce the solar lanterns and discuss their user experience. Our survey team, consisting of enumerators who speak the local dialect, attended all

tea meetings. They specifically told the seed households that their goal was not to convince their friend to buy a lantern but only to share stories about their experience and the performance of the lanterns.

Within each habitation, the three friends named by the seed are randomly assigned to the control, the network, or the communication treatment. The household of the friend in the control group is visited and asked for WTP immediately after the seed household provides the name of three friends. The procedure for the household of those in the network and communication is similar except for the two following differences. First, the visit to the network and communication households takes place about a month later. A one-month lag is a way to ensure that knowledge about the lantern can naturally diffuse from the seed household to peer households. Second, before playing the BDM game with the communication household, the seed invites his/her communication friend over to discuss his/her experience of the lantern.

4.3 Covariate Balance and Power Analysis

The balance table for the information treatments is shown in Table 2. As the table shows, the treatment groups are balanced across most covariates, with a few exceptions: gender of the respondent, savings and indebtedness. The control group has significantly more female head of household and about 450 rupees less in savings compared to the network and communication groups. This is a potential source for concern given households with more savings would be in a better position to bid higher prices. For this reason, as a robustness check, we include these variables in additional regression analysis.

[Table 2 about here.]

The balance table across the seed gender treatments is shown in Table 3. We note that, as could be expected, within each information treatment group the households referred by the female seeds are usually more likely to be headed by a female, while the households referred by the male seeds are usually headed by a male. It follows that the different groups display significant differences for variables such as education, expenses or literacy.

[Table 3 about here.]

Standard power analysis shows that the experiment can identify plausible treatment effects. Using the control group's mean and standard deviation (134 and 181), a standard deviation's uniform increase (to 315, with a standard deviation of 362) would be detected with an $\alpha = 0.95$ probability if the control and treatment group each had at least 65 participants. In our setting, each group has 200 subjects and, although we cluster standard errors by habitation ($N = 200$), the precision of our estimates is improved by habitation fixed effects.

5 Results

5.1 Main Estimates

Figure 4 shows the distribution of bids across treatment groups. There is a noticeable change in the distribution between the control group and the network group, and between the network group and the communication group: the distribution becomes flatter and displays a much fatter left tail. This likely indicates that our treatments have positive effects on WTP. We hardly notice important differences, however, when comparing the distribution across gender of the seed; this indicates that our gender treatment is not likely to have any effect.

We display boxplots of WTP for the different treatment groups on Figure 5, and the value of the mean WTP across treatments is shown in Table 4. Whether the differences between these various means are significant is reported in Table 5 and Table 6⁶. We find that the mean WTP in the network and communication treatments is significantly higher than in the control. Table 5 reveals that there is also a significant difference between the network and communication treatments when the sample is not split by gender. However, when looking only at the sample with female seeds, there is no significant difference between the means of the network and communication treatments. Finally, boxplots on Figure 5 seem to indicate that there is a difference between Male and Female in control group, but less so in the treatment groups. This is confirmed by Table 6: the difference in the control group is significant at 90% level. However we note that difference is not significant when using a rank-sum test. Mean comparisons, however, do not control for unobserved heterogeneity across habitations and for correlation between observations within the same habitation. We therefore proceed to use regression analysis with fixed effects and clustering of the standard errors at the habitation level.

[Figure 4 about here.]

[Figure 5 about here.]

[Table 4 about here.]

[Table 5 about here.]

[Table 6 about here.]

⁶both t-tests and rank-sum tests were performed

The main results from regression analysis are shown in Table 7. In all models, standard errors are clustered at the habitation level. Habitation fixed effects are not included in the second column because the gender treatment was randomized across habitations. Results show that the network treatment increased WTP by 120 Rupees compared to the control group. Given the mean WTP of the control group was 134 Rupees⁷, this corresponds to a 90% increase. Furthermore, the communication treatment increased WTP by 195 Rupees which corresponds to a 145% increase. The gender treatment however does not appear to have an effect. The inclusion of habitation fixed effects in column 4 reduces further the coefficient for the interaction of the gender treatment with the information treatment in the negative values. This would indicate that the gender treatment is detrimental to WTP, at least qualitatively.

[Table 7 about here.]

5.2 Robustness Checks

In Table 8, we include controls for monthly savings, one the imbalanced covariates. We see that the treatment effects coefficients slightly decrease from 120 to 108 Rupees in the network group and from 195 to 184 Rupees in the communication group. Yet, the effects remain extremely robust. The coefficient for monthly savings is significant at the 5% level but the magnitude is small: every additional Rupees in savings correlates with a WTP increase of 0.026 Rupees. Given the imbalance of savings across treatment groups, this represents an average contribution to the WTP of about 6 Rupees in the control group and 17 to 18 Rupees in the network and communication groups. The contribution of savings to the WTP is therefore an order of magnitude lower than the contribution of our information treatments. In fact, the raw correlation coefficient between WTP and savings is only of 0.15. This can be visualized on the scatter plot of WTP for the entire sample with amount of savings shown in the Appendix: those who had the highest amount of savings are not those who bid the highest WTP. In model 2, we interact monthly savings with the treatment dummies. The coefficient for the communication treatment is negative and significant at the 90% level indicating that savings and WTP correlate even in this treatment group. We also test models using monthly savings in log instead of levels and find similar results. Specifically, we note that the estimated treatment effects decreases a little, from 120 to 103 Rupees in the network group and from 195 to 177 Rupees in the communication group, but overall effects remain large and significant at the 99% level. Finally model 5 estimates the treatment effects for the sub-sample of respondents who declared having zero savings. This regression therefore only includes about half of the observations. We see that the treatment effects found within this subsample are

⁷Similarly, the value of the intercept in model 1 of Table 7 is 134.5 Rupees.

very similar to those found for the whole sample. This confirms that monthly savings is not the main driver of our treatment effects.

In Table 9, we add other control variables. In model 1, we control for whether the household head is female since this was the other unbalanced variable. Treatment effects for both the network and communication groups change little. In model 2, we control for both whether the household head is female and for the amount of monthly savings. The main treatment effects are slightly reduced but remain large and significant at the 99% level. In model 3, we control for the date of when the household was surveyed. Harvesting of maize and rice in the study area started at the end of September and early October respectively. This timing party coincided with our survey of the network and communication groups: about 20 % of our treated sample was indeed interviewed after September 25⁸. If those sampled households indeed began selling their harvest, they would likely afford greater expenditures, and consequently have a higher WTP for lanterns. We therefore investigate the robustness of our treatment effect to this possible “wealth effect”. To do this, we control for the date of interview in our regression. Specifically, the variable ‘Date’ is the month and day of the month on which the respondent was interviewed. If a wealth effect took place, respondents interviewed towards the end of the experiment are more likely to have access to cash and bid a higher price. The coefficient on ‘Date’ then should be positive. Results show that the coefficient is not significant and leans towards negative values⁹. This shows that respondents interviewed last were no more likely to bid higher amounts, which provides support against a wealth effect from the harvest season. In model 4, our main results remain robust to the inclusion of seven additional control variables. Most variables, such as education level, expenditures, whether the respondent is in debt and the size of the household, display small and insignificant coefficients. The number of children going to school shows a slightly larger coefficient but still insignificant. Only the number of kerosene lamps display a coefficient that is significant at the 10% level: households owning many kerosene lamps also bid slightly higher WTP. Intuitively, households with a greater number of kerosene lamps are likely to be households with a greater need for lighting products, which should translate into higher WTP.

[Table 8 about here.]

[Table 9 about here.]

⁸Rice Knowledge Management Portal, maintained by the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (<http://www.rkmp.co.in/content/rice-growing-seasons-of-uttar-pradesh>) indicates that in Uttar Pradesh summer rice is harvested in April-May and Kharif rice in November-December. On the other hand, wheat is harvested around March-April in the eastern part of UP, and around mid-April in the western part (<http://www.archive.india.gov.in/citizen/agriculture/index.php?id=11>). Our local team however indicated that a reasonable estimate for the first day of harvest in the region around Gonda City was September 25 for Maize and October 5 for rice, and we use these more conservative dates for our robustness check.

⁹Standard errors and coefficients are very large in this case due to the collinearity between our treatment dummies and the date variable.

5.3 Mechanisms

In this section, we investigate possible mechanisms to explain why our treatments are effective. Table 10 displays the mean response to various survey questions for each treatment group. The exact phrasing of the questions can be found in the appendix. First, the table provides evidence that our treatments were properly implemented: we see that respondents in the network and communication groups are much more likely to have seen a solar lantern before and much more likely to know someone owning a lantern compared to respondents in the control group. This is fully consistent with our experimental design. Furthermore, close to 90% of the respondents in the network and communication group said that they had conversations with that person more than three times a week. Hence the major difference between the network and communication groups is unlikely about the level of interactions with their friend owning a solar lantern. The third and fourth variables in the table provide some insights as to why WTP has increased. Contrary to the control group, most people in the network and communication groups now believe that, to function properly, a solar lantern needs proper maintenance; they also estimate the cost of such a product to a higher level than the control group. This indicates that a key learning from their friend’s experience relates to the technical quality of the lantern. At first, villagers might expect that solar lanterns are nothing more sophisticated than kerosene lanterns. They then observe their friend taking care of it; they note the photovoltaic panel that is connected to the lamp and which allows the battery to be charged. And they now perceive the product as a sophisticated item that requires careful maintenance and are therefore willing to pay a higher price. Interestingly, we note that respondents perceive solar lanterns positively. Almost everyone answered ‘Definitively’ to whether they believed the lantern was innovative, superior to a kerosene lamp, and whether they would recommend it to a friend over a kerosene lamp. This is despite the fact that most of those in the control group confirm they have never seen a solar lantern before and do not know anybody who owns one. It is also despite the fact that most people in the treated groups now recognize that a solar lantern can not function without proper maintenance.

[Table 10 about here.]

In one of the survey questions, we asked respondents how much they thought the lantern cost. The mean estimate approximates 730 Rupees with a standard deviation of about 500. Interestingly, the correlation between cost estimates and the willingness to pay is small in magnitude. Model 1 in Table 11 shows that every 100 extra Rupees in cost estimate correlates with an increase in willingness to pay of only about 8 Rupees. In model 2 of the same table, we investigate the treatment effects on the estimated cost: we note

that both the network and communication groups display higher estimated costs compared to the control group. In particular, respondents in the network group estimated the lantern at higher cost than respondents in the communication group. Yet, they bid lower prices in the BDM game on average. This indicates that the main mechanism through which tea meetings affect willingness to pay doesn't work through increasing respondents's perception of the product's cost.

[Table 11 about here.]

5.4 Why Did Gender not Affect Willingness to Pay?

In this section, we first examined how the gender treatment was implemented. To do this, we look at how different the male and female seeds are. We also look at how the friends chosen by the male and female seeds differed on a series of covariates. Table 12 displays differences between the male seeds and female seeds. Characteristically of gender inequalities in India, we observe that female seeds are less likely to be educated and literate. We also see that female seeds have a weaker connection to the village's social life: not only are they less likely to participate to village meetings or religious and political events, but they also somewhat have less trust in other villagers and declare having less friends and spending less time with these friends compared to male seeds. Notably, they are much more likely to be born outside the village which might play a role in explaining these findings. One question in the survey asked seeds who they thought would mostly be using the lanterns. It is interesting to see that 70% of female seeds declare that they will be the one using the lantern. Furthermore 30% of male seeds answered that their spouse would mostly use the product. Hence it appears that overall both genders agree that the lantern is a product useful to women.

Given these important differences between the two seed groups, we can expect that they choose friends that are different along household characteristics. And indeed, Table 13 reports characteristics of the household head of the female seed friends and the male seed friends. We observe that household heads in the female seed group are less likely to be educated and literate, and have fewer savings. But very importantly, we note that they are also more likely to be female. In other words, female seeds are more likely to choose a friend that is herself the head of her household, and it is likely that the differences in education, literacy and savings follow from that fact.

[Table 12 about here.]

[Table 13 about here.]

Our hypothesis about the gender treatment relies on the fact a male household head discounts information carried through a female network. Here, the sample of friends names by the female seeds are in fact composed

of a greater number of female household heads. These respondents, being female, are less likely to discount information received through their direct social network. As a result, it is possible that the absence of treatment effect results from such composition effect. To investigate further, we test the sensitivity of our results by dividing the sample according to the gender of the household head. Table 14 displays summary statistics for the two subsamples. We note that overall female household heads are younger, have more children, are less educated, less likely to be literate, have less savings, and are less likely to own a business. In Table 15, we run our main specification for the whole sample, the sub-sample of male household heads, and the sub-sample of female household heads. It is more difficult to precisely estimate the treatment effects for the female sub-sample because of the lower number of observations. However, we note that the effects of the network and communication treatments are comparable in both sub-samples. Model 4, 5 and 6 investigate the effect of the gender treatment in each sub-sample separately. We see that in the male sub-sample (model 5), our gender treatment still has little effect. This excludes the possibility that the absence of a strong effect of the gender treatment results from a composition effect. Instead, it indicates that the mechanism we hypothesised and discussed earlier might not be taking place.

[Table 14 about here.]

[Table 15 about here.]

In an attempt to explain why men did not discount female seeds in our setting, Table 16 looks at indicators of women's status. Our survey included a series of questions probing about gender norms in the villages. In the first set of questions, we asked respondents whether they believed women should ask permission to her husband or a family member before going out. Almost all household heads said that women should ask for permission to go to the health center, to go visit a friend or to go to the market. On the other hand, answers to other questions reflect more egalitarian views. Only about 5% of the sample said that they never talked with their spouse about what to spend income on, and about two thirds of the sample said they often had such discussions. In addition, virtually all households thought that women should have a say on how income is spent. Most respondents thought that it was *definitively* important that girls go to school. They further expressed the view that beating was rarely justified. Finally, most respondents thought that women were as able as men at using new technologies. It appears that gender norms here give women some say in purchasing decisions as well as when it comes to using new products. This might therefore explain why our gender treatment affected little the willingness to pay.

[Table 16 about here.]

6 Conclusion

Adoption and diffusion of new technologies is a crucial to improve the livelihood of poor communities. One important factor that promotes this process is information sharing through social networks. Adoption of a new technology is a social process because its adoption by an individual creates positive information externality to peers and this increases their expected welfare (Bardhan and Udry, 1999). Does rewarding individuals who make conscious effort to communicate information about new technologies increase willingness to pay by social network members? Whose social network in the household matter for the flow of information about new technologies? In this paper, we attempted to answer these questions by crafting a randomized controlled trial which involves distribution of multi-purpose solar lanterns under different treatments.

We collaborated with a local institution in rural India and assigned three peers of randomly recruited seed individuals (half of them male and half females) into a “network treatment”, a “communication treatment” and a “control group”. We elicited willingness to pay for the solar lanterns from the control group right after interviewing the seed household using the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) method (Becker, Degroot, and Marschak, 1964). We elicited willingness to pay for the lanterns from the “network” group one month after the seed households have used the lantern. We finally asked the seed households to invite one of the peers (the communication group) for a tea meeting to demonstrate and share their experiences in using the lantern after a month in return for an incentive payment of 100 rupees. The study area is non-electrified and households did not have previous information about the solar lanterns. These facts allowed us to explore the flow of information and the value households put into technologies that have large potential to improve quality of life by all household members.

Our results show that households who most likely learned about the solar lantern technology through their network (passive network) are willing to pay 120 Rupees more compared to the control group. Given the control group is willing to pay 134 Rupees on average, this corresponds to a 90% increase in WTP. On the other hand, households who attended a demonstration session by their peers (the communication treatment) are willing to pay 195 Rupees (145%) more than the control group. We do not find a statistically significant difference in WTP between male and female networks in both treatments.

Our findings have significant implications for policies that aim at promoting adoption and diffusion of new technologies in developing countries. If rewarding information communicator peers promotes information spill-over and willingness to pay, this implies that reducing the cost of the technology and allocating resources to communication will have significant welfare impact on society. The results also highlight the potential role

solar technologies could play in electrification. A significant proportion of households in developing countries do not have access to electricity and governments lack the required resources to extend the grid. Solar power has a large potential to tackle energy poverty by serving as a decentralized solution. In this regard, identifying the impact of incentivizing communication in inducing adoption and diffusion of such types of low-cost and environmental friendly technologies in rural set-ups provides useful information to policymakers and stakeholders who aim at improving the living conditions of poor households while protecting the environment.

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


Figure 1: Histogram of bids for the solar lantern. Summary statistics are as follows: minimum = 0; maximum = 1200; mean = 239; standard deviation = 266.




Figure 2: Map of study area around Gonda City. The green dots indicate the study habitations.




Figure 3: Timeline of the experiment.




Figure 4: Faceted histogram of bids for the solar lantern.




Figure 5: Boxplots of bids for the solar lantern.

	Total number of habitations		
	Control	Network	Communication
Male Seed	98	98	98
Female Seed	99	99	99

Table 1: Size of treatment groups. In all treatments, the sample household's head is interviewed. The gender treatment is randomized across habitations; the information treatment is randomized within habitations.

	Cont	Net	DIFF	Cont	Comm	DIFF	Net	Comm	DIFF
1) Individual Characteristics:									
Female respondent	0.355 (0.480)	0.198 (0.399)	0.157*** (3.54)	0.355 (0.480)	0.254 (0.436)	0.102** (2.20)	0.198 (0.399)	0.254 (0.436)	-0.0558 (-1.32)
Year of birth	1972.1 (14.76)	1971.8 (14.24)	0.239 (0.16)	1972.1 (14.76)	1970.7 (12.91)	1.345 (0.96)	1971.8 (14.24)	1970.7 (12.91)	1.107 (0.81)
Education	1.944 (1.352)	2.041 (1.435)	-0.0964 (-0.69)	1.944 (1.352)	1.893 (1.255)	0.0508 (0.39)	2.041 (1.435)	1.893 (1.255)	0.147 (1.08)
Reads hindi	0.477 (0.501)	0.487 (0.501)	-0.0102 (-0.20)	0.477 (0.501)	0.482 (0.501)	-0.00508 (-0.10)	0.487 (0.501)	0.482 (0.501)	0.00508 (0.10)
2) Household Characteristics:									
Number of children	3.693 (2.106)	3.918 (2.032)	-0.225 (-1.07)	3.693 (2.106)	4.015 (2.085)	-0.323 (-1.51)	3.918 (2.032)	4.015 (2.085)	-0.0979 (-0.47)
Number of children in school	1.370 (1.550)	1.412 (1.562)	-0.0426 (-0.27)	1.370 (1.550)	1.649 (1.657)	-0.280* (-1.71)	1.412 (1.562)	1.649 (1.657)	-0.237 (-1.45)
Household size	7.310 (3.916)	7.183 (3.379)	0.127 (0.34)	7.310 (3.916)	7.289 (3.375)	0.0203 (0.06)	7.183 (3.379)	7.289 (3.375)	-0.107 (-0.31)
3) Wealth-related variables:									
Monthly Expenses	4176.6 (2334.3)	4376.6 (3412.5)	-200 (-0.68)	4176.6 (2334.3)	4530.5 (2810.7)	-353.8 (-1.36)	4376.6 (3412.5)	4530.5 (2810.7)	-153.8 (-0.49)
Amount of Savings	223.4 (673.8)	682.2 (884.1)	-458.9*** (-5.79)	223.4 (673.8)	661.4 (1038.3)	-438.1*** (-4.97)	682.2 (884.1)	661.4 (1038.3)	20.81 (0.21)
In debt	0.467 (0.500)	0.609 (0.489)	-0.142*** (-2.85)	0.467 (0.500)	0.477 (0.501)	-0.0102 (-0.20)	0.609 (0.489)	0.477 (0.501)	0.132*** (2.65)
Owns a business	0.0355 (0.186)	0.0660 (0.249)	-0.0305 (-1.38)	0.0355 (0.186)	0.0711 (0.258)	-0.0355 (-1.57)	0.0660 (0.249)	0.0711 (0.258)	-0.00508 (-0.20)
Amount of land (acres)	1.310 (1.888)	1.443 (1.936)	-0.134 (-0.69)	1.310 (1.888)	1.415 (1.426)	-0.106 (-0.63)	1.443 (1.936)	1.415 (1.426)	0.0278 (0.16)
Owns cattle	0.873 (0.334)	0.873 (0.334)	0 (0.00)	0.873 (0.334)	0.929 (0.258)	-0.0558* (-1.86)	0.873 (0.334)	0.929 (0.258)	-0.0558* (-1.86)
Owns a phone	0.853 (0.355)	0.838 (0.370)	0.0152 (0.42)	0.853 (0.355)	0.868 (0.339)	-0.0152 (-0.44)	0.838 (0.370)	0.868 (0.339)	-0.0305 (-0.85)
4) Lighting-related variables:									
Number of kerosene lamps	2.376 (1.266)	2.421 (1.229)	-0.0457 (-0.36)	2.376 (1.266)	2.401 (1.043)	-0.0254 (-0.22)	2.421 (1.229)	2.401 (1.043)	0.0203 (0.18)
Hours of lighting	5.178 (2.368)	4.782 (1.814)	0.396* (1.86)	5.178 (2.368)	5.033 (1.766)	0.145 (0.69)	4.782 (1.814)	5.033 (1.766)	-0.251 (-1.39)

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 2: Balance table across treatments and associated T-tests. A rank-sum test (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney) was also performed for the variables that do not approximate a normal distribution. The only difference with the t tests are as follows. 1) The difference between control and communication for the number of children that go to school is significant at the 10% level. 2) The difference between network and communication for hours of lighting is now significant at the 10% level.

	Cont M	Cont F	DIFF	Net M	Net F	DIFF	Comm M	Comm F	DIFF
1) Individual Characteristics:									
Female respondent	0.153 (0.362)	0.556 (0.499)	-0.402*** (-6.47)	0.102 (0.304)	0.293 (0.457)	-0.191*** (-3.45)	0.153 (0.362)	0.354 (0.480)	-0.200*** (-3.31)
Year of birth	1971.3 (15.89)	1972.8 (13.58)	1.532 (-0.73)	1971.6 (15.06)	1972.1 (13.44)	-0.529 (-0.26)	1969.7 (12.82)	1971.8 (12.97)	-2.043 (-1.11)
Education	2.051 (1.357)	1.838 (1.345)	.213 (1.10)	2.265 (1.544)	1.818 (1.289)	0.447** (2.21)	1.980 (1.284)	1.808 (1.226)	0.172 (0.96)
Reads hindi	0.541 (0.501)	0.414 (0.495)	0.127* (1.79)	0.592 (0.494)	0.384 (0.489)	0.208*** (2.97)	0.490 (0.502)	0.475 (0.502)	0.0150 (0.21)
2) Household Characteristics:									
Number of children	3.543 (2.077)	3.837 (2.133)	-0.294 (-0.97)	3.823 (2.026)	4.010 (2.043)	-0.187 (-0.64)	3.918 (2.045)	4.113 (2.131)	-0.196 (-0.65)
Number of children in school	1.223 (1.489)	1.510 (1.601)	-0.287 (-1.28)	1.417 (1.499)	1.408 (1.630)	0.00850 (0.04)	1.526 (1.690)	1.773 (1.623)	-0.247 (-1.04)
Household size	7.357 (3.946)	7.263 (3.906)	0.0945 (0.17)	7.765 (3.705)	6.606 (2.927)	1.159** (2.44)	7.939 (3.472)	6.646 (3.163)	1.292*** (2.73)
3) Wealth-related variables:									
Monthly Expenses	3899.0 (2240.9)	4451.5 (2403.0)	-552.5* (-1.67)	4844.9 (4403.4)	3913.1 (1913.7)	931.8* (1.93)	4940.8 (3206.4)	4124.2 (2299.6)	816.6** (2.06)
Amount of Savings	278.6 (776.2)	168.7 (552.7)	109.9 (1.15)	717.3 (914.5)	647.5 (856.1)	69.87 (0.55)	672.4 (740.3)	650.5 (1270.3)	21.94 (0.15)
In debt	0.480 (0.502)	0.455 (0.500)	0.0250 (0.35)	0.582 (0.496)	0.636 (0.483)	-0.0547 (-0.78)	0.480 (0.502)	0.475 (0.502)	0.00484 (0.07)
Owns a business	0.0510 (0.221)	0.0202 (0.141)	0.0308 (1.17)	0.0816 (0.275)	0.0505 (0.220)	0.0311 (0.88)	0.0612 (0.241)	0.0808 (0.274)	-0.0196 (-0.53)
Amount of land (acres)	1.196 (1.157)	1.422 (2.404)	-0.226 (-0.84)	1.431 (1.678)	1.455 (2.170)	-0.0248 (-0.09)	1.604 (1.638)	1.228 (1.158)	0.375* (1.86)
Owns cattle	0.827 (0.381)	0.919 (0.274)	-0.0927* (-1.96)	0.867 (0.341)	0.879 (0.328)	-0.0114 (-0.24)	0.918 (0.275)	0.939 (0.240)	-0.0210 (-0.57)
Owns a phone	0.816 (0.389)	0.889 (0.316)	-0.0726 (-1.44)	0.806 (0.397)	0.869 (0.339)	-0.0626 (-1.19)	0.908 (0.290)	0.828 (0.379)	0.0799* (1.66)
4) Lighting-related variables:									
Number of kerosene lamps	2.235 (1.250)	2.515 (1.273)	-0.280 (-1.56)	2.439 (1.332)	2.404 (1.124)	0.0347 (0.20)	2.541 (1.141)	2.263 (0.921)	0.278* (1.88)
Hours of lighting	5.082 (2.218)	5.273 (2.515)	-0.191 (-0.57)	4.806 (1.892)	4.758 (1.743)	0.0485 (0.19)	5.005 (1.709)	5.061 (1.828)	-0.0555 (-0.22)

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 3: Balance table across treatments and seed gender and associated T-tests. A rank-sum test (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney) was also performed for the variables that do not approximate a normal distribution. The only difference with the t tests are as follows. 1) The difference in education level is significant at 10% in the control group. 2) The difference in household expenses is not significant in the network group. 3) The difference in savings seeds is significant at 10% in the communication group. 4) The difference in irrigated land is not significant in the communication group. 5) The difference in the number of kerosene lamps is not significant in the communication group.

	Control	Network	Communication
WTP - All seeds	133.5 (180.6)	254.9 (267.0)	330.2 (300.4)
WTP - Male Seed	107.1 (141.6)	245.4 (278.9)	334.2 (308.1)
WTP - Female Seed	159.6 (209.8)	264.4 (255.8)	326.3 (294.5)

Variable: Willingness to Pay. Means and standard deviations.

Table 4: Means across treatments.

	Differences		
	Control - Network	Control - Communication	Network - Communication
WTP - All seeds	-121.4*** (-5.27)	-196.7*** (-7.86)	-75.26*** (-2.61)
WTP - Male Seed	-138.2*** (-4.37)	-227.1*** (-6.61)	-88.85** (-2.10)
WTP - Female Seed	-104.8*** (-3.14)	-166.7*** (-4.59)	-61.83 (-1.57)

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5: Tests for means across treatments. Chi square tests for whether the mean WTP is the same in all treatment groups always yield that the three coefficients are different at the 1% level in the whole sample as well as in the subsample of female seeds and the subsample of male seeds. Rank-sum tests were also performed for each of the t-tests and p-values were found identical. The χ^2 test statistic for identical mean WTP across treatment groups is 94.17; with 34 degrees of freedom, the associated p-value equals 0. The χ^2 test statistic for the WTP to be equal in all treatment groups within the subsample of male seed is 60.99; with 30 degrees of freedom, the associated p-value equals 0.001. The χ^2 test statistic for the WTP to be equal in all treatment groups within the subsample of female seed is 55.69; with 32 degrees of freedom, the associated p-value equals 0.006. The z statistics for the rank-sum tests are as follows. First row: -5.5; -7.9; -2.8. Second row: -4.2; -6.2; -2.4. Third row: -3.6; -5.0; -1.5.

	Differences Male - Female
WTP - Control	-52.45** (-2.05)
WTP - Network	-19.07 (-0.50)
WTP - Communication	7.948 (0.18)

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 6: Tests for means across seed gender. Rank-sum tests are as follows. Control group: $z = -1.463$, $\text{Prob} > |z| = 0.1435$. Network: $z = -0.876$, $\text{Prob} > |z| = 0.3811$. Communication: $z = 0.166$, $\text{Prob} > |z| = 0.8682$.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	WTP	WTP	WTP	WTP
Network	119.883*** (22.115)		116.383*** (30.297)	136.988*** (30.847)
Communication	195.078*** (22.925)		204.785*** (32.325)	224.416*** (32.086)
Seed Gender		22.241 (24.674)		
Network x Female Seed			9.080 (38.292)	-34.067 (44.229)
Communication x Female Seed			-16.890 (42.631)	-57.749 (45.745)
Habitation fixed effects	Yes	No	No	Yes
Clustered SE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.157	0.002		0.161
Observations	585	585	585	585

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 7: Main results for experimental treatments. In column 1, the coefficients for Network and Communication are different at the 1% level.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Network	107.560*** (22.727)	114.829*** (28.718)	103.161*** (25.966)	119.744*** (33.841)	117.944*** (36.070)
Communication	183.525*** (23.902)	201.240*** (25.510)	177.301*** (27.383)	229.662*** (39.679)	214.382*** (43.535)
Amount of Savings	0.026** (0.013)	0.066** (0.033)			
Network x Savings		-0.037 (0.039)			
Communication x Savings		-0.053* (0.031)			
Savings (log)			5.689 (4.340)	19.353** (7.478)	
Network x log Savings				-14.007 (8.860)	
Communication x log Savings				-22.412** (9.470)	
Habitation fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clustered SE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.165	0.170	0.162	0.173	0.180
Observations	585	585	585	585	315

Standard errors in parentheses

Model57 is for the sub-sample of respondents that declare zero savings.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 8: Main results for experimental treatments control for amount of savings. We also tested a specification with logarithmized savings but the coefficient on savings was found non-significant (p-value=0.19).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Network	115.107*** (22.469)	103.683*** (22.937)	388.290** (180.316)	107.520*** (23.925)
Communication	191.915*** (23.112)	181.072*** (24.064)	470.514*** (180.690)	180.476*** (25.348)
Female Head	-31.046 (27.096)	-27.911 (26.594)	-29.942 (26.485)	-23.510 (29.275)
Amount of Savings		0.026** (0.013)	0.027** (0.013)	0.025** (0.012)
Interview date			-7.698 (4.800)	
Education				4.459 (11.716)
Monthly Expenses				-0.005 (0.005)
If in debt				-26.115 (26.128)
Household size				-2.565 (3.855)
Number of children to school				11.893 (7.433)
Number of kerosene lamps				19.780* (11.547)
Hours of lighting				1.415 (6.504)
Habitation fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clustered SE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.160	0.167	0.176	0.181
Observations	585	585	584	574

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 9: Main results for experimental treatments with control variables included.

	Cont.	Net.	DIFF	Cont.	Comm.	DIFF	Net.	Comm.	DIFF
Seen lantern before	0.244 (0.430)	0.934 (0.249)	-0.690*** (-19.49)	0.244 (0.430)	0.949 (0.220)	-0.706*** (-20.49)	0.934 (0.249)	0.949 (0.220)	-0.0152 (-0.64)
Know someone with lantern	0.132 (0.339)	0.924 (0.266)	-0.792*** (-25.78)	0.132 (0.339)	0.944 (0.230)	-0.812*** (-27.80)	0.924 (0.266)	0.944 (0.230)	-0.0203 (-0.81)
If can function properly	0.533 (0.500)	0.0508 (0.220)	0.482*** (12.39)	0.533 (0.500)	0.0914 (0.289)	0.442*** (10.73)	0.0508 (0.220)	0.0914 (0.289)	-0.0406 (-1.57)
Cost estimate	627.1 (558.7)	838.7 (647.9)	-211.6*** (-3.47)	627.1 (558.7)	736.6 (538.9)	-109.5** (-1.98)	838.7 (647.9)	736.6 (538.9)	102.1* (1.70)
Innovative product	4.939 (0.373)	4.980 (0.226)	-0.0405 (-1.30)	4.939 (0.373)	4.970 (0.200)	-0.0305 (-1.01)	4.980 (0.226)	4.970 (0.200)	0.0100 (0.47)
Superior to kerosene lamps	4.995 (0.0714)	4.980 (0.174)	0.0152 (1.13)	4.995 (0.0714)	4.985 (0.123)	0.0101 (1.00)	4.980 (0.174)	4.985 (0.123)	-0.00508 (-0.33)
Will recommend to others	4.995 (0.0712)	4.975 (0.187)	0.0203 (1.42)	4.995 (0.0712)	4.949 (0.346)	0.0457* (1.81)	4.975 (0.187)	4.949 (0.346)	0.0254 (0.91)

Table 10: Summary statistics for some key variables highlighting possible mechanisms.

	(1)	(2)
	Estimated cost	Estimated cost
WTP	0.390*** (0.091)	
Network		211.589*** (53.725)
Communication		109.538** (53.985)
Habitation fixed effects	No	Yes
Clustered SE	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.031	0.036
Observations	585	591

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 11: Results with cost estimate as dependent variable.

	Male Seeds	Female Seeds	Difference
Born in village	0.970 (0.171)	0.140 (0.349)	0.830*** (11.78)
Number of children	3.714 (2.021)	4.530 (2.418)	-0.816** (-2.11)
Education	2.090 (1.296)	1.480 (0.990)	0.610*** (3.86)
Education of spouse	1.265 (0.807)	2.360 (1.345)	-1.095*** (-7.10)
Reads hindi	0.530 (0.502)	0.310 (0.465)	0.220*** (3.15)
Amount of savings	387 (1197.5)	228 (1076.1)	159** (2.18)
Children use lighting for studying	0.560 (0.499)	0.700 (0.461)	-0.140** (-2.05)
Current lighting bad	4.175 (1.315)	4.544 (0.876)	-0.369** (-1.77)
Mostly be using: myself	0.490 (0.502)	0.700 (0.461)	-0.210*** (-3.02)
Mostly be using: my spouse	0.300 (0.461)	0.0500 (0.219)	0.250*** (4.64)
Discuss how to spend money	1.600 (0.684)	-0.180** (0.603)	(-1.96)
Women should work outside	3.690 (1.733)	4.470 (1.132)	-0.780*** (-3.10)
Participation in village meetings	0.280 (0.570)	0.140 (0.377)	0.140** (1.77)
Participation in farmers' cooperative meetings	0.140 (0.377)	0.0200 (0.200)	0.120*** (3.28)
Participation in religious group events	1.050 (0.702)	0.800 (0.739)	0.250** (2.46)
Participation in political events	0.370 (0.630)	0.100 (0.333)	0.270*** (3.66)
Trust other villagers	3.830 (1.436)	3.280 (1.694)	0.550** (2.14)
Spend time with friends (dummy)	0.380 (0.488)	0.240 (0.429)	0.140** (2.14)
Number of friends	10.02 (11.52)	6.390 (4.722)	3.630*** (3.05)

Table 12: Summary statistics for the two seed groups (male and female), with the corresponding z statistics of the rank-sum test. Variables with significant differences only are shown.

	Male Seed Friends	Female Seed Friends	Difference
Female respondent	0.136 (0.343)	0.401 (0.491)	-0.265*** (-7.25)
Education	2.099 (1.400)	1.822 (1.283)	0.277*** (2.95)
Reads hindi	0.541 (0.499)	0.424 (0.495)	0.117*** (2.83)
Amount of savings	556.1 (834.7)	488.9 (964.1)	67.23** (2.12)
Household size	7.687 (3.708)	6.838 (3.360)	0.849*** (2.90)
Can function properly	0.255 (0.437)	0.195 (0.397)	0.0598* (1.74)
Would feel safer if more light	4.990 (0.130)	4.959 (0.270)	0.0303* (1.90)
Was victim of kerosene fire	0.184 (0.388)	0.108 (0.311)	0.0759*** (2.62)
Knows a victim of a kerosene fire	0.323 (0.468)	0.249 (0.433)	0.0740** (1.99)
Mostly be using: myself	0.257 (0.438)	0.332 (0.472)	-0.0755** (-2.02)
Mostly be using: spouse	0.436 (0.497)	0.322 (0.468)	0.114*** (2.85)

Table 13: Social network analysis: characteristics of the friends chosen by the male seeds and the female seeds, with the corresponding z statistics of the rank-sum test. Variables with significant differences only are shown.

	Male	Female	Difference
Year of birth	1970.1 (14.74)	1975.5 (10.73)	-5.414*** (-4.24)
Number of children	3.787 (2.086)	4.114 (2.032)	-0.327* (-1.69)
Education	2.194 (1.411)	1.321 (0.895)	0.874*** (7.29)
Expenses	4384.3 (3073.8)	4298.7 (2303.3)	85.52 (0.32)
Savings	574.8 (965.0)	379.9 (684.9)	194.9** (2.34)
Owns a business	0.0741 (0.262)	0.0126 (0.112)	0.0615*** (2.86)
Household size	7.449 (3.578)	6.748 (3.471)	0.701** (2.13)
Number of children to school	1.410 (1.616)	1.658 (1.518)	-0.248* (-1.67)
Read hindi	0.590 (0.492)	0.189 (0.392)	0.402*** (9.26)
In debt	0.514 (0.500)	0.528 (0.501)	-0.0144 (-0.31)
Land	1.456 (1.668)	1.207 (1.993)	0.249 (1.53)
Irrigated land	1.406 (1.603)	1.158 (1.981)	0.247 (1.56)
Owns cattle	0.903 (0.297)	0.862 (0.346)	0.0411 (1.43)
Has a phone	0.856 (0.351)	0.843 (0.365)	0.0137 (0.42)
Number of kerosene lamps	2.451 (1.189)	2.258 (1.154)	0.194* (1.77)
Hours of lighting	4.906 (1.884)	5.245 (2.288)	-0.339* (-1.83)

Table 14: Summary statistics by gender of respondent. 159 observations for female and 432 for male.

	(1) All	(2) Male	(3) Female	(4) All	(5) Male	(6) Female
Network	119.883*** (22.115)	132.505*** (28.906)	131.282* (72.932)	136.988*** (30.847)	134.586*** (35.014)	183.333 (205.317)
Communication	195.078*** (22.925)	201.245*** (30.216)	173.572*** (64.552)	224.416*** (32.086)	224.802*** (36.442)	-58.333 (207.667)
Network x Female Seed				-34.067 (44.229)	-10.586 (62.968)	-74.003 (216.857)
Communication x Female Seed				-57.749 (45.745)	-63.893 (65.971)	261.340 (217.925)
Habitation fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clustered SE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.157	0.161	0.144	0.161	0.165	0.191
Observations	585	426	159	585	426	159

Standard errors in parentheses

Dependent variable: Willingness to Pay.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 15: Heterogeneity analysis by gender of respondent.

	Control	Network	Communication
1. Should ask permission to go the health center	0.975 (0.158)	0.959 (0.198)	0.954 (0.209)
2. Should ask permission to go visit a friend	0.995 (0.0712)	0.949 (0.220)	0.985 (0.123)
3. Should ask permission to go to the market	0.990 (0.101)	0.964 (0.186)	0.990 (0.101)
4. Talk about what to spend money on with spouse	1.660 (0.545)	1.645 (0.576)	1.492 (0.636)
5. Women should have a say on how to spend income	0.995 (0.124)	0.990 (0.101)	0.929 (0.277)
6. It is importnat that girls go to school	4.985 (0.214)	4.980 (0.141)	4.959 (0.222)
7. Women should work outside home or own a business	4.223 (1.415)	3.086 (1.786)	3.685 (1.756)
8. Beating justified if she goes out without telling	0.594 (0.492)	0.497 (0.501)	0.497 (0.501)
9. Beating justified if she argues with husband	0.589 (0.493)	0.624 (0.486)	0.680 (0.468)
10. Beating justified if suspected of adultery	0.706 (0.457)	0.741 (0.439)	0.822 (0.383)
11. Men are better able to use new technologies than women	3.452 (1.712)	3.264 (1.657)	2.924 (1.738)

Table 16: Women’s status. Note: Most variables are binary variables where 0 codes for no, and 1 for yes. Answers to question 4 are coded as follows: 0 for "Never", 1 for "Sometimes", 2 for "Often". Answers to question 6, 7, and 11 are as follows: 1 for "Definitively not", 2 for "Not really", 3 for "Neutral", 4 for "Somewhat" and 5 for "Definitively".